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Friday, October 19, 2018

We sure didn't see this one coming

Ana seems to be going out on a limb.


Folks we know you would like a complete response but all we can say at this point is piling it on.  Over the past few days we have been wading in stuff but nothing like this.  It was just a different kind of poop... 

Morgan sheriff, deputies sue blogger for defamation, conspiracy

  • Updated 

Thursday, October 18, 2018

Make you Go HMMMMMM...Sure they aren't referring to Morgan County??

Click on link below to read article on Al.Com

St. Clair warden fired for having sex with prison nurses

The Alabama Department of Corrections office in Montgomery.
The Alabama Department of Corrections office in Montgomery. (Mike Cason)
The State Personnel Board today upheld the firing of an assistant warden at St. Clair Correctional Facility for having sexual relationships with two contract nurses at the prison and using his state cell phone to exchange explicit photos and text messages with the nurses and an administrative assistant at the prison.
Cedric Specks, a warden II at St. Clair who had worked for the Department of Corrections for 21 years, was fired in June. He appealed the firing to the State Personnel Board.
Administrative Law Judge James Jerry Wood heard testimony from Specks and other witnesses at a hearing and recommended upholding the dismissal in an order issued Oct. 1. Wood found that DOC was justified in firing Specks for violating policies on sexual harassment and misconduct, use of state-owned property and fraternization with employees.
Wood’s order says that Specks admitted that he reached out to the three women on Facebook and in person and asked for explicit pictures, which he received on his state cell phone. It says he engaged in extra-marital sexual relations with the two nurses in 2016, 2017 and part of 2018 and used his state-assigned vehicle to facilitate the encounters.
Attorney Julian McPhillips, who represented Specks at the hearing, said it was shortsighted for the DOC to fire Specks because he was a skilled and experienced warden.

“This man had an immense skill and ability to get out in the prison yard and mix and meet with the inmates and put them at ease,” McPhillips said. “He helped to tame down and tone down a lot of violence at St. Clair Correctional Facility while he was there.”

Specks said the relationships with the two nurses were consensual and did not affect his work, Woods order says. Supervisors and subordinates testified that he was a “hands-on, highly visible and largely effective warden,” the order says.

But the order also says that the administrative assistant told investigators that Specks pressured her into sending explicit pictures of her to his state cell phone and later refused her request to delete them, an example of “classic sexual harassment.” The report says Specks tried to hide the photos on his phone in an encrypted “calculator” app. And it says Specks intervened on behalf of one of the nurses when she violated DOC policy by leaving the prison with inmate’s medications in her bag.
“By virtue of his executive position, Specks manipulated the three women to do his bidding,” the order says.
The DOC had no further comment on the matter today.

Wednesday, October 17, 2018

How Did Steven Ziaja Trial Go In Montgomery Today?

Steven Ziaja Otherwise known as (Ex Boyfriend of Sheriff Ana Franklin was in Montgomery for a Trial Starting Today. (If our sources are correct)

Will he face all 15 felonies or will he squeeeaaallllllllll? Only time will tell. Surely with all his years in law enforcement he knew better than to run NCIC checks to repossess cars from his crooked car lot. Did he do it for the love of Ana or just pure stupidity???? 

Image result for Picture of Pig Squealing


Another Good Read By Connor Sheets

Click on link below to view entire article on Al.Com

National, local advocates urge feds to investigate Alabama sheriffs over jail food money

Etowah County Sheriff Todd Entrekin. (Etowah County Sheriff's Office)
Etowah County Sheriff Todd Entrekin. (Etowah County Sheriff's Office)

Five national and local advocacy organizations sent a letter on Tuesday to Alabama's three U.S. attorneys asking them to investigate potential misuse of jail food funds by sheriffs across the state.
The letter, which was signed by the American Conservative Union Foundation, FreedomWorks, Southern Center for Human Rights, Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice and Adelante Alabama Worker Center, calls for federal authorities to ensure sheriffs are held accountable if they have improperly pocketed taxpayer money.
"It appears that some sheriffs have placed personal profit above their sworn duty to meet the basic needs of those in their care," Frank Knaack, executive director of Alabama Appleseed, says in the letter. "We are deeply concerned that those charged with enforcing our laws are instead breaking them. No one is above the law - this includes Alabama's sheriffs."
Blogger Comments: Sheriff Ana Franklin can tell you all about how she has skimmed funds, hundreds of thousands of funds from different accounts with her fuzzy math. This after campaigning she would be the most transparent Sheriff ever and she vowed she would absolutely not touch the inmate food funds. Is Pinocchio in the house??
The letter outlines a range of concerns that the advocacy organizations have about how county sheriffs manage public funds they receive to feed inmates in the county jails they oversee. It emphasizes what the five groups say is a need for a federal investigation into the longstanding practice of Alabama sheriffs keeping thousands of dollars worth of inmate-feeding money.

"Sheriffs with federal detention contracts who pocket money provided for feeding prisoners have abused the trust of the taxpayers - both in Alabama and across America - out of whose paychecks these dollars came," the letter states.
"We respectfully urge you to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute sheriffs with federal detention contracts who have converted jail food funds to their personal use."
The letter was also forwarded to a number of top federal officials including U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, FBI Director Christopher Wray and Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz.
The five signatories argue in the letter that some sheriffs - particularly the ones with contracts to house and feed federal inmates in their respective county jails - "may be engaging in financial misconduct" by mishandling jail food funds.
Blogger Comments: These corrupt Sheriffs have put a black eye on law enforcement in the entire state of Alabama.
Some sheriffs argue the practice is legal under a Depression-era law that they believe allows them to personally keep "excess" jail food money. But the five groups disagree with that reading of the law, according to the letter.
"Diverting funds provided to feed prisoners is not only unethical, it is likely illegal," David Safavian, general counsel for the American Conservative Union, said in the letter. "A fundamental requirement of federal contractors is to use the money for the purposes for which it was given. In this case, the avarice of some Alabama sheriffs doesn't pass the smell test. The stench should be investigated by those charged with protecting America's taxpayers."

The new call for a federal investigation comes as sheriffs weather intense public scrutiny over how they handle funds provided by federal, state and local agencies to feed inmates that they house in county jails.
The letter cited reporting published in March by that exposed that Etowah County Sheriff Todd Entrekin personally kept more than $750,000 worth of inmate-feeding funds and purchased a $740,000 beach house in Orange Beach.
"We understand that one such sheriff, Todd Entrekin, whose case has recently garnered considerable media attention, may have recently come under investigation by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General," the letter states. "The problem, however, appears to extend well beyond Etowah County."
It also cited a July report that quoted former kitchen workers in Etowah County's jail who said that the food served there was sub-par, insufficient and sometimes rotten or spoiled.
"The people in these sheriffs' custody are human beings, not abstract profit margins," Jessica Vosburgh, executive and legal director of Adelante Alabama, said in the letter. "As long as their jailers see each person behind bars as an opportunity to reap additional profits with impunity, the incentives to cut corners in ways that threaten these individuals' basic safety will abound. Taxpayers will ultimately foot the bill with our wallets, and detained persons with their health, their wellbeing, and sometimes even their lives."

In January, the Southern Center for Human Rights and Alabama Appleseed - which both signed the letter sent Tuesday - filed suit against 49 Alabama sheriffs who declined to provide financial records showing if they personally kept any jail food money for personal use. They argued in the suit that such records are public and that their disclosure is essential to ensure that the sheriffs are not abusing their positions by improperly benefiting from taxpayer funds.
"The law is clear, and Governor [Kay] Ivey has made clear: jail food funds are public funds, and should be used exclusively for feeding incarcerated people," Aaron Littman, staff attorney at the Southern Center for Human Rights, said in the letter. "Because these sheriffs have refused to disclose to the public how much taxpayer money they have taken, further investigation is urgently required to determine whether they are violating federal criminal and contracting law."

Who Has Their Hand in The Cookie Jar?

Why Alabama cities need (and encourage) crime

Blogger Comments: This is happening all over the state. Politicians/Sheriff's getting rich of the taxpayers in Alabama. The Sheriff of Morgan County has not released any of her Financial records from the pistol permit funds, the inmate food funds (which she stole $160k from and invested into her convicted felons cousin shady car dealership), nor any other funds for that matter. The only ones she has released have been fuzzy math.

See John Archibald story on

Why Alabama cities need (and encourage) crime

Gavel, court gavel ( file)

Gavel, court gavel ( file) (Mark J. Terrill)


This is an opinion column.
I credit Hub Harrington with healing my blindness. He didn’t lay on hands. He didn’t operate. He just did his job and the scales fell from my eyes.
I can see! I can see!
I can see that justice should not be a get-rich-quick scheme, that squeezing poor defendants beyond their ability to pay, and shackling them to a court system more interested in profit than rights, is fundamentally unAmerican.
Harrington, a now-retired judge from Shelby County, ruled in a Harpersville case involving blatant misuse of the justice system to churn profits for the city and for a private probation company. He put it in words Alabama could understand. It was a debtor’s prison, he wrote in his 2012 ruling. It snubbed almost every safeguard afforded by the U.S. Constitution and stood as an obstacle to life, liberty and the pursuit of that stuff we claim to stand for.
It looked, for a minute, like Alabama saw the light. And the darkness that comes from turning cops and courts into bill collectors.
But we’re still in the dark. Still criminalizing people for their inability to pay and treating our own citizens differently – as a matter of policy – when they’re broke.
A report last week by the Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, the UAB Treatment Alternatives for Safer Communities and several other groups laid it all out. Again.

Maybe it can do for others what Harrington did for me.
The findings were stark. Alabama’s courts do not prevent or deter crime. They encourage it.
Courts are paying the bills because politicians are too scared to properly fund government. They force the justice system to come up with its own money. So of course the cost is passed along to offenders.
Cops and courts become dependent on the money to operate. 
Blogger Comments: Sheriff Ana Franklin of Morgan County knows all about making money, stealing money,  building mansions.
Cities need criminals to run in the black. Police are incentivized not just to write tickets but to prosecute.
Every time a $35 bail bond fee is issued, for instance, three fourths of the money goes straight back to law enforcement.
But that’s not all. Of the millions in court costs and fines levied each year, most is sent to state and local general funds and other agencies that come to rely on it.
This is not justice. It’s business. With a badge.
Of course if you get a ticket and have money to pay it’s no big deal. You move on and call it the cost of a mistake. But if you don’t have cash to pay you’re strung along paying high fines and fees to a creditor who can put you in jail.
The authors of the report interviewed 980 Alabamians who were caught up in that system. Most said they gave up food or rent or medical care or child support to pay off those fines, and 40 percent – four out of 10 – admitted committing more crimes to pay it off.

They commit crimes to pay fines. And 20 percent of those whose only other crimes were traffic offenses said they committed more serious offenses to pay their traffic tickets. We’re talking bad checks, selling drugs, robbery.
In the name of justice.

We cannot even fathom the damage it does. It makes people fear and distrust police officers, who are put in a terrible position.
It criminalizes people who aren’t criminals, clogs the courts and takes time from real policing. The report cites a national study that shows courts relying heavily on court debt solved crimes at a lower rate.
This is not justice. It is the opposite of it, disguised by a badge and a robe and a gavel.
It’s time, Alabama, to see the light.
John Archibald, a Pulitzer Prize winner, is a columnist for Reckon by His column appears in The Birmingham News, the Huntsville Times, the Mobile Register and Write him at

Tuesday, October 16, 2018

Splitting Hairs - Who Does Charley Know

Folks, the article or story that came out on Fox 10 TV is a must read.  It makes you wonder who Charlie knows.  Charley has had his run-ins with the law.  He was a Spokesman for the U.S. Attorney General.  He pled guilty of leaking information from a Grand Jury.  As reported by the associated press.  An excerpt reads as follows.  "Prosecutors charged McNichol with theft of government property for leaking secret information to a "personal friend" about an indictment of former Orange Beach Mayor Steve Russo and three others, and a planned news conference to announce the charges."  He also killed 4 people during a high-speed chase as a law enforcement officer after being ordered to stand down.  

Now back to the rest of the story and you are not going to believe this.  According to a Mobile County Communications District Board Member by the name of Adams, Charlie met with them and informed them that he was in his county vehicle but wasn't driving when police found him.  He went on to say he was asleep and he pulled over.  

Ok.  Charlie is pulled over in a drunken state asleep, not driving, and gets a PI and he will not lose his job.  Who in the heck does ole Charlie know?  He drinks and drives until he passes out or falls asleep on the side of the road and poor Charlie doesn't even get fired.  Another incident of it isn't what you know and do, it's who you know.  

What do you bet that when good ole Charlie goes to court, it will be dismissed?  Hopefully, the judge will see through this silly madness that could have cost peoples their life had he continued to drive. 

Folks this really isn't funny but it's being treated like a joke by those in positions of power.  Should you get caught passed out at the wheel of a vehicle we recommend you plead the Charlie defense.

New details in the arrest of Mobile County 911 director

  • Updated 
  • Director of Mobile County 911 Center issues statement following arrest

  • In addition to Charlies "PI" and leaking information about a Grand Jury while he was a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney General.  

  • We blogged another story involving Charley McNichol on Thursday, November 9, 2017 that explains how he killed four people in a high-speed pursuit while working as an officer.  We understand that Charlie was told to stand down but continued the pursuit.

  • Our readers will be surprised to learn that sources tell us Ana and Charlie were stopped by State Troopers while leaving Alabama vs LSU game last weekend.  Thank goodness Sheriff Franklin did not have to walk the walk.  She wasn't driving.  However, we hear good ole Charlie showed his butt. Throwing his weight around letting the trooper know who he is.  Wow! That sounds familiar.  Sounds like Larry Berzett doesn't it?

    It's obvious that Franklin surrounds herself with blowhards.  Just look at their cowardly comments they make if you can find them. Charlie pulled a "don't you know who I am attitude."

    These issues are serious if true.   The issues of drinking and driving are serious and should not be tolerated no matter who you are.  Ana and Charlie are arrogant and are determined to get their way.  We heard they bulled the officers.  We know that when the officers ran the tag it came back to the Morgan County Commission.

    From what we understand this makes three stops for Ana.  Even if she wasn't driving we were told that she was quite inebriated.   We were also told that Charlie the driver of the Morgan County Commission vehicle was drunk.  Charlie is as irresponsible as Ana.  We noticed them drinking heavily one night at a local bar.  We also know that Charlie got into his SUV after drinking several drinks and drove off.  Charlie killed 4 people during a high-speed chase after being told to stand down.  Our sources tell us his boss ordered him to abandon the chase but he didn't.  Consequences. While the rest of us are out there abiding the law while driving Ana and Charlie are out there mocking the laws.  Fame, Power, and Prestige is their identity in their own minds.  We believe they are nothing but common criminals who used MCSO money to purchase and then upgrade their property in Saraland.  Charlie and Ana's heads have gotten bigger since living it up in a private sky-box with the people they purchased the Saraland property from.

    It sure looks like Ana is two sheets in the wind in the above picture.

    United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

    James Larry FIKES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DAPHNE; Joseph Hall, Police Chief for City of Daphne; Susan Hostetter, City Personnel Manager a/k/a Susan Cowart; Charlie McNichol, Employee for the City of Daphne; Walter Gipson, Employee for the City of Daphne, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

    No. 94-7216.

        Decided: April 09, 1996

    Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and DYER and GARTH *, Senior Circuit Judges.Wayne A. Ehlers, Semmes, AL, for appellant. M. Kathryn Knight, Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, for appellees.
    This appeal presents the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing, for failure to state a claim, a police officer's complaint alleging that he was discharged from his employment for exercising his freedom of speech. We find that the complaint does state a claim. We therefore VACATE the court's judgment and REMAND the case for further proceedings.
    On October 19, 1989, appellant went to work for the City of Daphne, Alabama, as an officer in its police department. On July 15, 1992, following a pretermination hearing, the City discharged appellant for “good cause,” consisting of
    (a) Deliberately stealing, destroying, abusing or damaging City property, tools, or equipment, or the property of another employee, citizen or visitor;
    (b) Disclosure of confidential city information to unauthorized persons;
    (c) Wilfully disregarding City policies or procedures.1
    On June 10, 1994, twenty-three months after his discharge, appellant brought this suit against the City, the city manager, the city personnel manager, the police chief, and three police officers.2  In a quintessential “shotgun” pleading,3 appellant sought compensatory damages 4 against the defendants severally to redress deprivation of rights secured by:
    (a) The First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution providing for the rights of all persons ․ to enjoy freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly, to petition their government for redress of their grievances, to be secure in their persons, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to enjoy privacy, to be free from slavery and deprivations of life, liberty and property without due process of law, and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 1985(2), providing for the protection of all persons in their civil rights and the redress of deprivation of rights under color of law; and
    (b) the common law of the State of Alabama providing for damages to persons subjected to the intentional [infliction] of emotional distress or the intentional interference with employment contracts.
    The “Statement of Facts” contained in the complaint is rather disorganized. It is difficult, without some speculation, to discern precisely what took place and how, if at all, the events interact with one another. In addition, one must read between the lines to determine which events deprived appellant of the various constitutional and statutory rights mentioned above. Given these impediments to an accurate construction of appellant's complaint, we relate the events described in, or arguably inferable from, appellant's Statement of Facts. We set out these events in the order in which they appear in the pleading.
    (1) As noted above, appellant's employment in the police department began in October 1989 and, following a pretermination hearing, terminated in July 1992, purportedly for good cause.
    (2) After his discharge, appellant sought employment at the municipal airport in Mobile, Alabama, but was turned down because the City's personnel manager said that he was ineligible for reemployment with the City.
    (3) In August 1990, while employed by the police department, appellant was injured while responding to a domestic dispute. He filed a worker's compensation claim. Following surgery, his physician said he could return to work if restricted to light duty. The chief of police, Joseph Hall, put appellant on full duty, telling him that if he could not do his job, someone would be found who could.
    (4) After his worker's compensation claim was settled and he returned to work, appellant attempted to reopen his claim.
    (5) Soon after returning to work, appellant suffered “additional symptoms, which required the services of a chiropractor.” The chiropractor placed additional restrictions on his work activity; for example, appellant could not wear a “duty belt” while sitting. Appellant's supervisor told appellant that he could not work without wearing the belt.
    (6) In August 1992, during a Department of Industrial Relations hearing on appellant's worker's compensation claim, the City's personnel manager testified falsely that appellant had not reported to work since the previous March.
    (7) On May 26, 1990, Officer McNichol, a defendant here, ignored an order from his superior, Sergeant Gipson, to terminate a high-speed automobile chase. McNichol disregarded the order and continued the pursuit. The pursuit resulted in four fatalities. Appellant immediately reported the incident to Chief Hall and, in November 1991, to the Alabama Bureau of Investigation (“ABI”).
    (8) Sergeant Johnson, another defendant in the case, drove a vehicle “that had not been properly condemned” on personal business. Appellant reported the incident. The ABI determined that Johnson's use of the vehicle was improper.
    (9) At some point prior to his discharge, appellant commenced an “investigation of certain improprieties within the Daphne Police Department.” Chief Hall told him “to be quiet about the entire matter.”
    (10) Appellant disregarded the chief's admonition and continued his investigation. He reported his findings to “other appropriate authorities,” including the ABI. When Chief Hall learned of these reports, he told the city manager that appellant had to be fired. Chief Hall then “devised and initiated a systematic strategy to eliminate [appellant] from the Daphne Police Department.” The chief's strategy succeeded on July 15, 1992, when the City discharged appellant.
    (11) On November 12, 1991, Sergeants Gipson and Johnson “attempted to interrogate [appellant] regarding his investigation of the improprieties that [appellant] had witnessed within the Daphne Police Department. [Appellant] responded by informing [them] that he would not elaborate unless his attorney was present along with [Chief] Hall. [Sergeants Gipson and Johnson] responded by citing [appellant] for insubordination.”
    (12) The City terminated appellant's employment without cause.5  The grounds the City cited as good cause for the termination were pretextual. The City discharged appellant because he was reporting episodes of misconduct in the Police Department to the ABI and “other appropriate authorities.”
    Drawing on these facts, appellant sought in his complaint to hold the defendants liable on four counts. The first two counts contained state law claims: that the City lacked good cause for discharging appellant, and that the City breached its duty to treat appellant “in a manner so as not to cause him unnecessary mental and emotional distress,” by intentionally engaging, through its agents and employees, “in a clearly outrageous course of conduct causing severe emotional distress and physical harm to [appellant].” The third and fourth counts alleged violations of various federal constitutional and statutory provisions. Counts three and four each alleged damages in excess of three million dollars.
    Count three states that during appellant's employment in the police department, and in discharging him on July 15, 1992, the defendants
    either acted in a concerted, malicious intentional pattern to deprive [appellant] of his constitutional rights, or knowing that such [deprivation] was taking place, knowingly omitted to act to protect [appellant] from continuing deprivations of his rights to enjoy freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly, to petition his government for redress of grievances, and to be free from deprivations of life, liberty and property without due process of law; all in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States․
    [Moreover, the defendants,] in acting to deprive [appellant] of his rights, went far beyond actions reasonably necessary for the discharge of their duties and within the scope of their employment, and instead misused their official powers and acted from a willful and malicious intent to deprive [appellant] of his civil rights and cause him grievous injuries thereby.
    [Finally, the defendants] acted in an outrageous and [systematic] pattern of harassment, oppression, intimidation, bad faith, employment discrimination, cover-up and retaliation directed at [appellant]․
    Count four of the complaint states that the defendants,
    acting individually and in their official capacities as supervisory and administrative officers of the City ․ conspired, planned, agreed and intended to harass, intimidate and cause economic injury to [appellant]. [Their] purpose in so acting was to prevent [appellant], through economic and psychological violence and intimidation, from seeking the equal protection of the laws, and from enjoying the equal privileges and immunities of citizens under the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Alabama, including but not limited to his rights to enjoy freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly, to petition his government for redress of grievances, and to be free from deprivations of life, liberty and property without due process of law; all in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
    Pursuant to their conspiracy, [defendants] acted to deprive [appellant] of his civil rights, by repeated and insidious act[s] of harassment, retaliation, intimidation, bad faith and threat, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
    One has to guess at the number of claims for relief appellant attempted to state in counts three and four. By combining several claims for relief in each count, appellant disregarded the rules governing the presentation of claims to a district court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleader, in setting forth a claim for relief, to present “a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides that “[a]ll averments of claim ․ shall be made in separate paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances․” Moreover, “[e]ach claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence ․ shall be stated in a separate count ․ whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.” These rules work together
    to require the pleader to present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which is not.
    T.D.S. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1543 n. 14 (11th Cir.1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
    The Rules of Civil Procedure also provide a cure for the problem presented by counts three and four. Specifically, if a complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that a [defendant] cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading,” the defendant may move for a more definite statement before filing a response. “If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the [complaint] or make such order as it deems just.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).
    Although it is likely that a more definite statement would have tightened appellant's complaint and perhaps eliminated many of the claims, the defendants elected not to seek one.6  Instead, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), they moved the court to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim for relief. They also moved the court to strike portions of the complaint as redundant.
    Concluding that appellant's complaint failed to allege a cognizable federal claim, the court dismissed counts three and four. The court held, however, that even assuming the presence of a cognizable federal claim, the defendants, who were sued in their individual as opposed to their official capacities, were entitled to qualified immunity. See generally Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir.1994). Finding that the Rule 12(b)(6) ruling stripped the court of federal question jurisdiction, the court dismissed the pendent state law claims without prejudice. This appeal followed the entry of final judgment for the defendants.
    Appellant's sole challenge to the district court's judgment is that the court erred in dismissing his claim under the First Amendment, which is made applicable to state and local governments by the Fourteenth Amendment.7  Given that error, appellant contends, it follows that the court should not have dismissed the pendent state law claims in counts one and two.
    Appellant asks us to read his complaint as alleging that the City, pursuant to a conspiracy with the individual defendants in the case, discharged appellant for exercising speech on a matter of public concern-specifically, Officer McNichol's disregard of Sergeant Gipson's order to discontinue the high-speed chase, which resulted in four deaths. Appellant's complaint strongly implies, if it does not explicitly allege, that when Chief Hall learned that appellant was investigating “improprieties ․ [appellant] had witnessed within the ․ Department” and that he was reporting his findings to “appropriate authorities, including the ABI,” he told appellant to be quiet and, when appellant persisted, he told the City's personnel manager that appellant had to go.
    It is well established that a state may not discharge a public employee in retaliation for public speech. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). This circuit employs a four-part test to determine whether a state (or, as in this case, a city) has done so.
    First, a court must determine whether the employee's speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384, 107 S.Ct. at 2896; Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S.Ct. 2708, 129 L.Ed.2d 836 (1994) (citing Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1989)). Speech addresses a matter of public concern when the speech can be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. In the present case, appellant has alleged that he was fired because he reported police misconduct (i.e., failure to terminate a dangerous, high-speed chase, and improper use of a confiscated vehicle).8  Certainly, the question of whether police officers are properly performing their duties, as a public safety issue, must be considered an issue of political or social concern. Moreover, in alleging police misconduct, Fikes sought to “bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of” government officials. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. at 1691. “[A] core concern of the [F]irst [A]mendment is the protection of the ‘whistle-blower’ attempting to expose government corruption.” Bryson, 888 F.2d at 1566. Therefore, Fikes has alleged sufficient facts to establish that he engaged in speech on a matter of public concern.
    Second, a court must weigh the employee's “[F]irst [A]mendment interests” against the interest of the City, as an employer, “in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754. In performing this balancing test, a court must consider several factors: (1) whether the speech at issue impeded the government's ability to perform its duties effectively; (2) the manner, time and place of the speech; and (3) the context within which the speech was made. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-55, 103 S.Ct. at 1692-94; Morales v. Stierheim, 848 F.2d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1013, 109 S.Ct. 1124, 103 L.Ed.2d 187 (1989). We can discern no indication that Fikes' actions disrupted the functioning of the Daphne police department. To the contrary, Fikes's attempts to expose police malfeasance helped further the municipality's responsibility to provide effective law enforcement services. In addition, Fikes chose to express his accusations at a “time, place, and manner” so as to minimize possible disruptions to the police department.
    Third, a court must determine whether the speech in question played a “substantial part” in the government's decision to discharge the employee. Id. Without a doubt, appellant's complaint raises this inference. Chief Hall's comment to the City's personnel manager indicates that the chief wanted appellant out of the police department. In addition, after appellant refused to reveal the results of his investigation to Sergeants Gipson and Johnson, they cited him for insubordination. Finally, a comparison of what the City initially cited as “good cause” (when it notified appellant of his discharge and his right to a pretermination hearing), with the “good cause” the City found after the hearing indicates that appellant was discharged for conduct other than that cited in the prehearing notice.9  The contrast between the notice and the discharge order suggests that the City arrived at good cause after the fact and without notice to appellant. From this it might be inferred, depending on the other evidence in the case, that the City had committed itself to terminating appellant's employment whether or not good cause existed. In any event, it seems clear to us that appellant has created an issue for the factfinder as to whether his speech played a “substantial part” in the City's decision to fire him.
    Fourth, if the employee shows that the speech was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to discharge him, the City must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. Whether the City can satisfy this burden is obviously a matter for another day.
    We VACATE the district court's judgment in favor of the City and the individual defendants in their individual capacities, insofar as it dismisses the First Amendment claim described above. We REMAND that claim for further proceedings. Due to the manner in which appellant has pled his complaint, however, the contours of that claim may differ when the district court, in narrowing the issues, calls appellant's counsel to task and determines precisely what it is that appellant contends. Our holding, therefore, is limited to the reading we have given the complaint in this opinion.
    We also VACATE the court's dismissal of appellant's pendent claims and REMAND those claims for further proceedings.
    27. On May 26, 1990, while FIKES was off duty, but was riding in a patrol car with Sergeant Walter Gipson, a high speed pursuit originated in the police jurisdiction of the City of Daphne. Due to the fact that said pursuit was becoming a danger to non-participants of the pursuit, it was ordered by Sergeant Walter Gipson to break-off the pursuit. This call to break-off was witnessed by FIKES. This order to break-off was ignored by Officer Charlie McNichol, with said high speed pursuit resulting in four fatalities. The four fatalities were subsequent to the order to Officer Charlie McNichol to break-off the pursuit.
    28. FIKES reported the conduct of Officer Charlie McNichol regarding the high speed chase to Chief Joe Hall and again in an Alabama Bureau of Investigation (hereafter referred to as “ABI”) report dated November 22, 1991. As a direct result FIKES was accused by Chief Joseph Hall (hereafter referred to as “HALL”) of falsifying an official report to the City of Daphne, and of later stealing said report.
    29. Melvin Johnson took a vehicle that had not been properly condemned and used the vehicle for personal use. Melvin Johnson was the acting Assistant Chief during this time period. The ABI determined in their investigation that Melvin Johnson should not have been using said vehicle for his personal use. HALL recommended that FIKES be terminated for reporting the improper use of the vehicle, although it was not out-right stated by HALL that the recommendation for termination was for reporting the vehicle matter.
    30. Charlie McNichol filed a report containing false allegations with HALL regarding FIKES' investigation of certain improprieties within the Daphne Police Department. HALL responded to said report by informing FIKES to be quiet about the entire matter.
    31. After HALL became aware of the fact that FIKES was conducting an investigation and was reporting his findings to other appropriate authorities, to include the ABI, HALL went to the City Manager and asked the City Manager to “shit-can” FIKES. HALL, while acting under color of state law devised and initiated a systematic strategy to eliminate FIKES from the Daphne Police Department. HALL later stated to others “that he had only fired one man in the past two-years, and he had fired him, (FIKES), because he called and had him (HALL) investigated”.
    32. On November 12, 1991, Sergeant Walter Gipson and Sergeant Melvin Johnson attempted to interrogate FIKES regarding his investigation of the improprieties that FIKES had witnessed within the Daphne Police Department. FIKES responded by informing said individuals that he would not elaborate unless his attorney was present along with HALL. Sergeant Walter Gipson and Sergeant Melvin Johnson responded by citing FIKES for insubordination.
    1.   This statement of good cause is taken verbatim from appellant's complaint.
    2.   Appellant also sued “DOES ONE through FIVE.” The district court, in its order dismissing the case, struck these unknown persons as defendants.
    3.   See Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S.Ct. 167, 116 L.Ed.2d 131 (1991).
    4.   In the first paragraph of his complaint, appellant alleged that he “seeks to enjoin the defendants from continuing to deprive him of [his constitutional] rights.” In the prayer for relief at the conclusion of his complaint, however, appellant made no mention of equitable relief. Rather, he sought only money damages.
    5.   The allegation that appellant's discharge was unlawful because it was without cause does not appear in the Statement of Facts, but rather in count one of the complaint.
    6.   The district court had the inherent authority to require the appellant to file a more definite statement. Such authority, if not inherent in Rule 12(e), is surely within the district court's authority to narrow the issues in the case in order to speed its orderly, efficient, and economic disposition. In this case, the district court would have acted well within its discretion if, acting sua sponte, it had returned the complaint to appellant's attorney (retaining a copy for the court file) with the instruction that he plead the case in accordance with Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b).
    7.   In its order dismissing the complaint, the district court stated that it had “consider[ed] ․ the motion, plaintiff's response in opposition thereto, defendants' reply brief and pertinent portions of the record․” Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,[i]f, on a motion ․ to dismiss for failure ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).To the extent that the district court's opinion can be read as showing that the court relied upon matters outside of the complaint, we should construe the order as granting summary judgment rather than dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). However, in order to convert a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) into a summary judgment motion, the district court is required to provide sufficient notice to the parties of its intent to do so. Here, the court failed to provide such notice. Therefore, we will treat the district court's order as one granting a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal rather than an order granting summary judgment.
    8.   The relevant portions of Fikes' complaint follow in an Appendix to this opinion.
    9.   The initial notice to appellant recited:(a) Violation of [police] department rules of conduct by making false accusations against other officers in the department;(b) Insubordination;(c) Making untrue public statements;(d) Filing untrue and inaccurate departmental reports; and,(e) Making false accusations and [misrepresenting] facts in a report of an official investigation.This statement of good cause is taken verbatim from appellant's complaint. As noted supra, the cause recited in the eventual discharge order read quite differently. It recited:(a) Deliberately stealing, destroying, abusing or damaging City property, tools, or equipment, or the property of another employee, citizen or visitor;(b) Disclosure of confidential city information to unauthorized persons;(c) Wilfully disregarding City policies or procedures.
    TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

Gene it looks like some folks are tired of the nepotism within your office

New sheriff won't make brother chief deputy  
MOULTON — The new Lawrence County sheriff squelched rumors of possible nepotism on his first day in office.
Sheriff Gene Mitchell said he has no plans to hire his brothers, retired Moulton police officers.
Is Sheriff Gene Mitchell in violation of the County rules and regulations in the County handbook? specifically, Rule 1.2.1 Nepotism? 

First up is Reserve Deputy Ray Mitchell who is a cousin to Sheriff Gene Mitchell.  Ray is a fine fellow, many joke within the department with Ray being smart and such a good fellow if he is really 
a Mitchell. Ray is commonly referred to as Santa Claus! This is because Ray Mitchell is in violation of the department's policy on facial hair, a policy that investigators and drug task force agents are not allowed to violate. Employees routinely talk about if he was not a Mitchell he could not get away with policy violations. Even though Ray has never been to the police academy and is not a certified officer
he is issued a marked county vehicle to drive, even to drive home.  It hurts morale when one individual is allowed to violate the rules just because of his name and the fact he is family. Now the 
The sheriff will say Ray provides a service to the County, the question is does that give him the right to be the only person to violate certain rules of the department that other employees and reserves must follow or is it really only because he is cousin Ray?  More to come...

Reserve Ray Mitchell.

Alabama Code Title 41. State Government § 41-1-5